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Debates about the desirability and disadvantages of nonstandard
work arrangements often make assumptions about the motivations and
attitudes of individuals who work in these arrangements, as well as the
quality of jobs associated with them. For example, temporary work-
ers—and some part-time workers—are usually thought to work in their
jobs involuntarily and to have jobs with less security, lower earnings,
and fewer other job rewards. Consequently, temporary and part-time
workers are usually believed to be dissatisfied with their jobs and to
engage in fewer organizational citizenship behaviors. Although these
assumptions provide the basis for much of our thinking about non-
standard work arrangements and for our policy recommendations
related to them, these beliefs are often untested. 
To the extent that studies have examined the correlates of non-
standard work arrangements at all, they have generally focused on their
economic rewards (usually wages, and sometimes fringe benefits). We
know much less about the meanings that nonstandard workers attach to
their work, such as the extent to which they regard work as a central
life interest, the importance they place on various job characteristics,
and whether they choose nonstandard work voluntarily. It is commonly
assumed, for example, that part-time workers are more concerned than
full-time workers with nonwork aspects of life, such as family and lei-
sure, and that part-time and temporary workers are less concerned than
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full-time workers with career advancement. Moreover, we know rela-
tively little about the noneconomic benefits and utilities that nonstand-
ard workers obtain from their jobs, such as their degree of job security,
perceived opportunities for promotion, and assessments of the intrinsic
rewards (i.e., the degree to which jobs are interesting, meaningful, and
challenging). Finally, there is little empirical evidence available on
how regular full-time workers and nonstandard workers differ in mea-
sures of well-being, such as job satisfaction and work-related stress,
and outcomes, such as organizational commitment, work effort, and
absenteeism.
In this chapter, we seek to fill in some of these gaps by examining
the extent to which workers in nonstandard arrangements differ from
full-time workers in their work values, job rewards, work attitudes (job
satisfaction, work-related stress, and organizational commitment) and
work behaviors (such as reported absenteeism). Our analysis is based
on a cross-national survey data set, the 1997 International Social Sur-
vey Program (ISSP) module on “work orientations” (see Appendix A
for a description of the data). This data set permits us to examine the
work attitudes and job rewards associated with various nonstandard
work arrangements in the United States, Japan, and a number of Euro-
pean countries.
We first discuss how we measure nonstandard work arrangements
in this data set. We then summarize how our measures of work values,
job rewards, and worker attitudes and behaviors differ among the vari-
ous work arrangements and countries. Finally, we indicate implications
of our findings for future research on nonstandard work arrangements.
NONSTANDARD WORK ARRANGEMENTS
Types of Nonstandard Work Arrangements
Nonstandard work arrangements between an employer and worker
may differ in one or more ways from standard (i.e., full-time, open-
ended) work arrangements. First, nonstandard work arrangements
might be part-time and involve fewer hours per week than full-time
work. Second, they might be temporary, such as in fixed-term arrange-
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ments, where the employment relation is closed- rather than open-
ended. Third, the nonstandard work arrangement might not be an
employment relationship at all, but might constitute a contracting rela-
tionship between an employer and a self-employed contractor. We will
examine these three common types of nonstandard work arrangements
in this chapter.
Measuring Work Arrangements
We restricted the sample to those working for pay and then coded
respondents into four mutually exclusive types of work arrangements.
Respondents who indicated that they were self-employed were coded
as such regardless of their full- or part-time status. We identified as
“fixed-term temporaries” those who said that their job is for a fixed
term lasting either “less than 12 months” or “for one year or more.”1
The remaining respondents were then classified as being either full-
time or part-time based on a work status variable coded by the ISSP
researchers.2
Table 12.1 presents estimates of the prevalence of part-time, fixed-
term temporary, and self-employed work arrangements in the ISSP
data for the 11 countries we examine.3 In the remainder of the chapter,
we examine how these four categories of work arrangements differ
with regard to their work values, job rewards, and work attitudes and
behaviors. Appendix Table 12.B1 describes how we measured each of
these dependent variables in the ISSP data set. 
WORK VALUES
By work values, we mean the motivations that people have for
working and the importance they place on work in general and on spe-
cific facets of their jobs. Work values consist of three sets of concepts:
1) the extent to which people are involved in work, or the centrality of
work to their lives; 2) the importance people place on various job fac-
ets, or their “conceptions of the desirable” with regard to their work
activity; and 3) the extent to which people work in the particular
arrangement voluntarily or involuntarily.
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Table 12.1 Persons in Nonstandard Work Arrangements, 
by Country (%)
Table 12.2 presents descriptive statistics (means or percentages) on
these three sets of variables for each of the four work arrangements in
each of the 11 countries. Table 12.3 presents results for regression
models that estimate differences in these measures of work values
between full-time workers, on the one hand, and part-time, fixed-term,
and self-employed persons, on the other, controlling for gender, age,
education, and three dichotomous variables representing occupational
groups (i.e., managerial, professional, and other white-collar occupa-
tions). These regression coefficients were obtained from the following
equation, which we estimated for each work value.
(1) Y = a + b1PT + b2FIXED-TERM + b3SELF-EMPLOYED
+ b4CONTROLS + e
Centrality of Work
Part-time workers do not differ much from full-time workers in the
extent to which they regard work as a central life interest. This result is




United States 15 10 14
Japan 9 24 27
West Germany 11 9 11
Great Britain 15 12 15
Netherlands 35 22 NA
France 12 11 5
Italy 5 8 30
Spain 11 25 4
Denmark 14 11 7
Sweden 19 8 11
Norway 10 12 11
SOURCE:  1997 ISSP data.
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Table 12.2 Mean Work Values by Job Status and Country
Importance 














Full-time 2.6 4.6 4.0 4.2 4.4 3.6 28.1
Part-time 2.5 4.4 3.8 4.2 4.5 3.7 43.2
Fixed-term 2.6 4.5 4.1 4.1 4.6 3.6 22.2
Self-employed 2.8 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.8 32.7
Total 2.6 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.6 30.3
Japan
Full-time 3.7 4.0 4.0 2.8 4.0 3.4 15.4
Part-time 4.1 3.9 3.7 2.6 3.9 3.6 22.6
Fixed-term 3.8 4.2 3.8 2.8 3.9 3.3 16.9
Self-employed 4.4 4.1 4.0 2.9 4.0 3.7 39.5
Total 4.0 4.1 3.9 2.8 4.0 3.5 22.8
West Germany
Full-time 2.9 4.7 3.9 3.8 4.5 3.3 27.3
Part-time 2.8 4.6 3.7 3.7 4.4 3.5 9.6
Fixed-term 2.7 4.6 3.8 3.9 4.6 3.4 25.8
Self-employed 3.1 4.3 3.5 3.7 4.6 3.6 35.5
Total 2.9 4.6 3.8 3.8 4.5 3.4 26.2
Great Britain

















Part-time 2.5 4.5 3.7 3.8 4.4 3.5 15.2
Fixed-term 2.6 4.6 3.8 4.0 4.5 3.3 30.2
Self-employed 2.7 4.5 3.8 3.8 4.4 3.5 32.9
Total 2.5 4.6 3.9 3.9 4.4 3.3 28.8
Netherlands
Full-time 2.8 4.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 3.4 19.3
Part-time 2.7 4.2 3.5 3.8 4.3 3.7 28.0
Fixed-term 2.7 4.2 3.5 3.9 4.4 3.6 22.5
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total 2.8 4.2 3.6 3.9 4.4 3.6 23.0
France
Full-time 3.0 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.7 3.6 52.7
Part-time 3.1 4.6 3.8 3.5 4.6 4.0 22.1
Fixed-term 3.2 4.5 3.8 3.6 4.6 3.6 33.3
Self-employed 3.5 4.2 3.8 3.6 4.7 3.9 58.3
Total 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.7 3.7 47.1
Italy
Full-time 3.0 4.6 4.1 3.9 4.4 3.8 34.4
Part-time 2.9 4.3 3.8 3.9 4.5 3.9 30.8
Fixed-term 3.4 4.7 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.6 39.5
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Self-employed 3.2 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.6 4.2 38.2
Total 3.1 4.6 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.9 35.8
Spain
Full-time 3.5 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 11.9
Part-time 2.9 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.9 50.0
Fixed-term 3.3 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.3 3.7 23.0
Self-employed 3.1 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.1 57.1
Total 3.4 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 20.3
Denmark
Full-time 3.1 4.1 3.5 3.2 4.6 3.4 27.0
Part-time 3.0 4.1 3.4 3.2 4.5 3.5 24.7
Fixed-term 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 4.6 3.4 29.7
Self-employed 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.1 4.7 4.2 26.7
Total 3.1 4.0 3.5 3.2 4.6 3.4 27.0
Sweden
Full-time 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 4.5 3.7 37.9
Part-time 3.3 4.5 3.7 3.3 4.4 3.7 26.7
Fixed-term 2.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 4.5 3.8 43.1
Self-employed 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.4 3.9 44.8
Total 3.1 4.4 3.8 3.4 4.5 3.8 37.0
Norway
Full-time 3.1 4.5 3.8 3.5 4.5 3.5 31.1

















Fixed-term 3.1 4.3 3.6 3.5 4.6 3.4 19.4
Self-employed 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.2 4.4 3.7 52.9
Total 3.2 4.5 3.7 3.4 4.5 3.5 30.8
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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berg 1995).  The mean levels of work involvement are higher for part-
time than for full-time workers in Sweden, Japan, and France (Table
12.2), although this difference is statistically significant only in Swe-
den when we control for the background demographic variables and
occupational differences (Table 12.3). Only in Spain are part-time
workers significantly less likely than full-time workers to regard work
as a central life interest once we control for demographic and occupa-
tional differences.
Self-employed persons are more likely than full-time employees to
regard work as a central life interest (except in Spain; Table 12.2), but
this gap is statistically significant only in Sweden and (at p < 0.10) in
Norway and Italy (Table 12.3).
Fixed-term workers in Italy, France, and Norway are significantly
more likely than full-time workers to regard work as a central life inter-
est (Table 12.2). Fixed-term employees in West Germany, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden are less likely to be involved in
work than full-time workers (Table 12.2), but these differences are not
statistically significant when demographic and occupational variables
are controlled for (Table 12.3).
Importance of Job Facets
Individuals value different things about their work. Some persons
place primary importance on money, or extrinsic rewards. Others find
more meaning in jobs that are intrinsically satisfying. Still others see a
job as a stepping-stone to other, more highly rewarding jobs. This sec-
tion examines whether employees in nonstandard work arrangements
value different aspects of their jobs differently than full-time workers.
Job security
Part-time workers are significantly less likely to place high impor-
tance on job security than full-time workers in the United States, West
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain; part-time workers are more
likely than full-time workers in the Netherlands to value job security
(Table 12.3). Self-employed persons are significantly less likely to
value job security than are regular full-time employees in all countries
except Great Britain, Spain, and Japan (Table 12.3). Fixed-term












































Part-time –0.13 –0.17** –0.21*** –0.04 0.08 0.05 1.92***
Fixed-term 0.00 –0.07 0.12 –0.07 0.10 0.01 0.68 
Self-employed 0.11 –0.27*** 0.01 –0.05 0.10 0.29*** 1.24
N = 817 808 806 801 806 800 816
Adj. R2 = 0.011 0.023 0.022 0.035 0.013 0.021 0.059
Japan
Part-time 0.18 –0.07 –0.20* 0.02 0.00 0.18 2.67**
Fixed-term 0.06 0.14* –0.12 –0.07 –0.05 –0.09 1.28 
Self-employed 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.28** 5.85***
N = 724 714 723 708 725 721 672
Adj. R2 = 0.109 0.019 0.024 0.025 0.015 0.028 0.121
West Germany
Part-time –0.18 –0.15* –0.14 –0.01 0.08** 0.19 0.12***
Fixed-term 0.01 –0.10 –0.14 0.12 0.08 –0.01 0.95 
Self-employed 0.06 –0.28*** –0.39*** –0.02 0.07* 0.33** 1.35 
N = 603 627 620 611 624 607 629
Adj. R2 = 0.057 0.036 0.027 0.001 0.051 0.015 0.156
Great Britain
Part-time 0.04 –0.25*** –0.16 –0.03 –0.01 0.19 0.19***
Fixed-term 0.21 –0.11 –0.06 0.05 0.08 –0.02 0.65 
Self-employed 0.12 –0.10 –0.12 –0.12 0.02 0.32*** 1.15 
427
Table 12.2 Mean Work Values by Job Status and Country
Importance 














Full-time 2.6 4.6 4.0 4.2 4.4 3.6 28.1
Part-time 2.5 4.4 3.8 4.2 4.5 3.7 43.2
Fixed-term 2.6 4.5 4.1 4.1 4.6 3.6 22.2
Self-employed 2.8 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.8 32.7
Total 2.6 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.6 30.3
Japan
Full-time 3.7 4.0 4.0 2.8 4.0 3.4 15.4
Part-time 4.1 3.9 3.7 2.6 3.9 3.6 22.6
Fixed-term 3.8 4.2 3.8 2.8 3.9 3.3 16.9
Self-employed 4.4 4.1 4.0 2.9 4.0 3.7 39.5
Total 4.0 4.1 3.9 2.8 4.0 3.5 22.8
West Germany
Full-time 2.9 4.7 3.9 3.8 4.5 3.3 27.3
Part-time 2.8 4.6 3.7 3.7 4.4 3.5 9.6
Fixed-term 2.7 4.6 3.8 3.9 4.6 3.4 25.8
Self-employed 3.1 4.3 3.5 3.7 4.6 3.6 35.5
Total 2.9 4.6 3.8 3.8 4.5 3.4 26.2
Great Britain

















Part-time 2.5 4.5 3.7 3.8 4.4 3.5 15.2
Fixed-term 2.6 4.6 3.8 4.0 4.5 3.3 30.2
Self-employed 2.7 4.5 3.8 3.8 4.4 3.5 32.9
Total 2.5 4.6 3.9 3.9 4.4 3.3 28.8
Netherlands
Full-time 2.8 4.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 3.4 19.3
Part-time 2.7 4.2 3.5 3.8 4.3 3.7 28.0
Fixed-term 2.7 4.2 3.5 3.9 4.4 3.6 22.5
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total 2.8 4.2 3.6 3.9 4.4 3.6 23.0
France
Full-time 3.0 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.7 3.6 52.7
Part-time 3.1 4.6 3.8 3.5 4.6 4.0 22.1
Fixed-term 3.2 4.5 3.8 3.6 4.6 3.6 33.3
Self-employed 3.5 4.2 3.8 3.6 4.7 3.9 58.3
Total 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.7 3.7 47.1
Italy
Full-time 3.0 4.6 4.1 3.9 4.4 3.8 34.4
Part-time 2.9 4.3 3.8 3.9 4.5 3.9 30.8
Fixed-term 3.4 4.7 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.6 39.5
429
Self-employed 3.2 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.6 4.2 38.2
Total 3.1 4.6 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.9 35.8
Spain
Full-time 3.5 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 11.9
Part-time 2.9 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.9 50.0
Fixed-term 3.3 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.3 3.7 23.0
Self-employed 3.1 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.1 57.1
Total 3.4 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 20.3
Denmark
Full-time 3.1 4.1 3.5 3.2 4.6 3.4 27.0
Part-time 3.0 4.1 3.4 3.2 4.5 3.5 24.7
Fixed-term 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 4.6 3.4 29.7
Self-employed 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.1 4.7 4.2 26.7
Total 3.1 4.0 3.5 3.2 4.6 3.4 27.0
Sweden
Full-time 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 4.5 3.7 37.9
Part-time 3.3 4.5 3.7 3.3 4.4 3.7 26.7
Fixed-term 2.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 4.5 3.8 43.1
Self-employed 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.4 3.9 44.8
Total 3.1 4.4 3.8 3.4 4.5 3.8 37.0
Norway
Full-time 3.1 4.5 3.8 3.5 4.5 3.5 31.1

















Fixed-term 3.1 4.3 3.6 3.5 4.6 3.4 19.4
Self-employed 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.2 4.4 3.7 52.9
Total 3.2 4.5 3.7 3.4 4.5 3.5 30.8












































Part-time –0.13 –0.17** –0.21*** –0.04 0.08 0.05 1.92***
Fixed-term 0.00 –0.07 0.12 –0.07 0.10 0.01 0.68 
Self-employed 0.11 –0.27*** 0.01 –0.05 0.10 0.29*** 1.24
N = 817 808 806 801 806 800 816
Adj. R2 = 0.011 0.023 0.022 0.035 0.013 0.021 0.059
Japan
Part-time 0.18 –0.07 –0.20* 0.02 0.00 0.18 2.67**
Fixed-term 0.06 0.14* –0.12 –0.07 –0.05 –0.09 1.28 
Self-employed 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.28** 5.85***
N = 724 714 723 708 725 721 672
Adj. R2 = 0.109 0.019 0.024 0.025 0.015 0.028 0.121
West Germany
Part-time –0.18 –0.15* –0.14 –0.01 0.08** 0.19 0.12***
Fixed-term 0.01 –0.10 –0.14 0.12 0.08 –0.01 0.95 
Self-employed 0.06 –0.28*** –0.39*** –0.02 0.07* 0.33** 1.35 
N = 603 627 620 611 624 607 629
Adj. R2 = 0.057 0.036 0.027 0.001 0.051 0.015 0.156
Great Britain
Part-time 0.04 –0.25*** –0.16 –0.03 –0.01 0.19 0.19***
Fixed-term 0.21 –0.11 –0.06 0.05 0.08 –0.02 0.65 
Self-employed 0.12 –0.10 –0.12 –0.12 0.02 0.32*** 1.15 
433
N = 523 539 535 535 535 534 540
Adj. R2 = 0.015 0.013 0.026 0.024 0.046 0.030 0.120
Netherlands
Part-time –0.03 0.12* –0.05 –0.03 0.06 0.17* 1.95***
Fixed-term –0.06 0.09 –0.08 –0.03 0.05 0.05 1.27 
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
N = 1204 662 651 646 381 1146 1063
Adj. R2 = 0.036 0.042 0.039 0.031 0.049 0.028 0.034
France
Part-time 0.08 –0.09 –0.12 –0.32*** –0.03 0.23 0.17***
Fixed-term 0.32** –0.15* –0.23** –0.26** –0.01 –0.11 0.37***
Self-employed 0.36 –0.37*** –0.17 –0.29* 0.04 0.29 1.69 
N = 687 689 679 676 686 673 693
Adj. R2 = 0.080 0.085 0.012 0.031 0.015 0.024 0.129
Italy
Part-time 0.17 –0.30** –0.31* –0.02 0.06 0.00 0.48 
Fixed-term 0.50** 0.12 –0.05 0.03 0.09 –0.26 0.97 
Self-employed 0.25* –0.22*** –0.11 0.01 0.16*** 0.34*** 1.10 
N = 476 475 475 473 476 473 474
Adj. R2 = 0.041 0.071 0.032 0.021 0.046 0.047 0.085
Spain
Part-time –0.616*** –0.19* 0.16 –0.11 –0.05 0.47** 6.65***
Fixed-term –0.128 –0.06 0.02 –0.10 0.04 0.19 1.69 
Self-employed –0.522 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.54* 13.75***
N = 388 392 391 391 391 387 392
Adj. R2 = 0.044 0.003 0.005 –0.012 0.051 0.018 0.200
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433
N = 523 539 535 535 535 534 540
Adj. R2 = 0.015 0.013 0.026 0.024 0.046 0.030 0.120
Netherlands
Part-time –0.03 0.12* –0.05 –0.03 0.06 0.17* 1.95***
Fixed-term –0.06 0.09 –0.08 –0.03 0.05 0.05 1.27 
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
N = 1204 662 651 646 381 1146 1063
Adj. R2 = 0.036 0.042 0.039 0.031 0.049 0.028 0.034
France
Part-time 0.08 –0.09 –0.12 –0.32*** –0.03 0.23 0.17***
Fixed-term 0.32** –0.15* –0.23** –0.26** –0.01 –0.11 0.37***
Self-employed 0.36 –0.37*** –0.17 –0.29* 0.04 0.29 1.69 
N = 687 689 679 676 686 673 693
Adj. R2 = 0.080 0.085 0.012 0.031 0.015 0.024 0.129
Italy
Part-time 0.17 –0.30** –0.31* –0.02 0.06 0.00 0.48 
Fixed-term 0.50** 0.12 –0.05 0.03 0.09 –0.26 0.97 
Self-employed 0.25* –0.22*** –0.11 0.01 0.16*** 0.34*** 1.10 
N = 476 475 475 473 476 473 474
Adj. R2 = 0.041 0.071 0.032 0.021 0.046 0.047 0.085
Spain
Part-time –0.616*** –0.19* 0.16 –0.11 –0.05 0.47** 6.65***
Fixed-term –0.128 –0.06 0.02 –0.10 0.04 0.19 1.69 
Self-employed –0.522 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.54* 13.75***
N = 388 392 391 391 391 387 392

















Part-time –0.053 –0.09 –0.08 0.06 –0.10 0.01 0.60*
Fixed-term 0.017 –0.40*** 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.10 1.51 
Self-employed 0.358 –0.50*** –0.24 –0.17 0.15 0.92*** 1.08 
N = 625 623 625 625 625 623 625
Adj. R2 = 0.062 0.064 0.008 0.057 0.041 0.049 0.053
Sweden
Part-time 0.24** –0.11 –0.19* –0.12 –0.14** 0.03 0.38***
Fixed-term –0.20 –0.28*** –0.28*** –0.26** –0.07 –0.01 1.02 
Self-employed 0.32** –0.63*** –0.32*** –0.12 0.00 0.14 1.63**
N = 750 773 769 765 772 769 786
Adj. R2 = 0.114 0.157 0.034 0.046 0.073 0.030 0.072
Norway
Part-time 0.003 –0.09 –0.15** –0.13 –0.04 0.06 0.21***
Fixed-term 0.000** –0.22*** –0.14** –0.01 0.09** –0.17** 0.39***
Self-employed 0.000* –0.34*** –0.26*** –0.24*** –0.03 0.30*** 3.42***
N = 1406 1433 1425 1413 1427 1423 1432
Adj. R2 = 0.079 0.085 0.023 0.045 0.038 0.032 0.192
*p ≤ 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
a Unstandardized coefficients are presented.
b The last column reports odds ratios from logistic regressions and the Nagelkerke R2. All the other coefficients are unstandardized OLS estimates. All mod-
els control for sex, age, education, and occupation (except the model for the Netherlands, which does not include variables for occupation).The Nagelkerke
R2 is a measure of the strength of association in a logistic regression model (see N.J.D. Nagelkerke, 1991. “A Note on a General Definition of the Coef-
ficient of Determination.” Biometrika 78(3): 691–692. There is, however, no widely accepted direct analog to OLS regression's R2 in a logistic regression.
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and France, to value job security, but they
are more likely to value job security in Japan (Table 12.3).
Earnings
Full-time workers are more likely to place greater importance on
high income than part-time workers in all countries except Spain
(Table 12.2). The differences between part- and full-time workers
remain statistically significant in the United States, Japan, Italy, Swe-
den, and Norway once we control for demographic characteristics and
occupational differences (Table 12.3). 
Fixed-term employees in France, Sweden, and Norway are signifi-
cantly less likely to value high income; only in West Germany, Swe-
den, and Norway are self-employed persons significantly less likely
than full-time employees to value high income (Table 12.3).
Opportunities for promotion
Individuals in the four work arrangements do not appear to differ
much in the importance they place on opportunities for promotion.
Part-time workers place less value on opportunities for promotion than
full-time workers in Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, the Nether-
lands, France, Spain, Sweden, and Norway (Table 12.2), although only
in France are these differences statistically significant once we control
for demographic characteristics and occupational groups (Table 12.3).
In addition only in France and Sweden do fixed-term employees place
significantly less importance than full-time workers on opportunities
for promotion (Table 12.3).
Interesting work
There are also relatively few differences among workers in terms
of the importance placed on interesting work. Part-time workers value
interesting work significantly more than full-time workers only in
West Germany and they value it less only in Sweden. Self-employed
persons in West Germany and Italy are significantly more likely to
value interesting work. Fixed-term and full-time employees differ in
the importance they place on having interesting work only in Norway
(fixed-term workers value this more; Table 12.3).
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Flexible hours
Part-time workers are more likely than full-time workers to value
flexible hours in all countries except Sweden (Table 12.2), but only in
the Netherlands, France, and Spain is this difference statistically signif-
icant once we control for demographic characteristics and occupation
(Table 12.3). Self-employed persons value flexible work more highly
than regular full-time workers in all countries (Table 12.2); this differ-
ence remains statistically significant after controlling for the back-
ground demographic variables and occupation in all countries except
France and Sweden (Table 12.3). This pattern is consistent with the
view that workers (especially women with children) often become self-
employed to have greater flexibility in their schedules (Boden 1999).
Full-time and fixed-term employees do not differ significantly in the
importance they place on flexible hours except in Norway (where
fixed-term employees value flexible hours less; Table 12.3).
Working Voluntarily versus Involuntarily
Individuals may choose or be constrained to work in the various
types of work arrangements. Research on this issue, of course, is ham-
pered by the ambiguity of what is meant by “voluntary” behavior. 
We coded respondents as working voluntarily or involuntarily dif-
ferently in the various work arrangements. Self-employed persons
were coded as involuntary if they said that they would rather work for
someone else as opposed to being self-employed. Full-time workers
were coded as involuntary if they said that they would rather work
part-time, while part-time workers were coded as involuntary if they
said that they preferred to work full-time. Unfortunately, we do not
have a measure of whether fixed-term workers chose temporary work
arrangements involuntarily. Thus, for fixed-term employees, we cre-
ated a measure of involuntary status based on their part-time/full-time
status. The resulting estimates for fixed-term employees are somewhat
lower than we would expect based on a conventional understanding of
involuntary employment given that most fixed-term employees do not
likely choose fixed-term work. For example, data from the Current
Population Surveys (CPS) in the United States indicate that people
tend to work in temporary jobs involuntarily in the sense that they
would prefer to work in standard work arrangements.4
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Workers in the United States are especially likely to say they are
working part-time involuntarily. Our results suggest that 43.2 percent
of part-time workers in the United States are involuntary, a little higher
than estimates based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), which indicate that about one-third of part-time workers in
1993 preferred a full-time job. Our estimate of involuntary full-time
employment in the United States (28.1 percent) is also higher than the
estimate from BLS data of the full-time workers who prefer part-time
jobs (about 10 percent in 1985; see Tilly 1996). Fifty percent of the
part-time workers in Spain and 30.8 percent of part-time workers in
Italy also say that they would prefer a full-time job (Table 12.2). Rela-
tively few part-time workers in West Germany (9.6 percent) and Great
Britain (15.2 percent) say they would prefer a full-time job. On the
other hand, more than half the full-time employees in France say they
would prefer a part-time job. Part-time workers in the United States,
Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain are significantly more likely to
desire a change in work status than full-time employees. In Italy, part-
time workers and full-time workers are equally likely to desire a
change in work status. In all the other countries, workers seem to prefer
part-time work: a larger percentage of full-time workers desire part-
time work than vice versa (Table 12.3).
More than one-quarter of self-employed persons in each country
say that they would prefer to work for someone else (Table 12.2); the
highest percentages (more than half of such persons) are in Spain, Nor-
way, and France. Approximately 40 percent of self-employed persons
in Sweden and Japan say they would rather work for someone else. In
some cases, these relatively high rates of involuntary self-employment
may reflect poor economic conditions. For example, in Japan, a signif-
icant portion of unemployment is likely to be disguised as self-employ-
ment. Given the prolonged recession in that country, the Japanese have
a tendency to dismiss (retire) older workers and hire them back as low-
paid consultants. 
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JOB REWARDS
Job rewards refers to the benefits and utilities that people obtain
from their jobs. Most research on nonstandard work and job rewards
focuses on earnings and has shown that part-time workers and tempo-
raries generally earn less than regular full-time workers and they
receive fewer fringe benefits. However, workers may also seek other,
noneconomic benefits from their jobs. These include intrinsic rewards
obtained from jobs that are interesting, meaningful, and challenging;
opportunities for promotion and career advancement; job security; and
flexibility in setting one’s own hours.
Table 12.4 presents mean levels of job rewards for each work
arrangement in each of the 11 countries. Table 12.5 presents results for
regression models that estimate differences in these measures of job
rewards between full-time workers, on the one hand, and part-time,
fixed-term, and self-employed persons, on the other, controlling for the
importance the person places on the reward, along with his or her gen-
der, age, education, and occupation (similar to Equation 1). 
Perception of pay
Full-time employees perceive that their pay is high compared with
part-time workers in each country (Table 12.4), although the gap is sta-
tistically significant only in West Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
and Sweden (Table 12.5). Full-time workers are more likely than
fixed-term employees to perceive that their pay is good in all countries,
except Japan (Tables 12.4 and 12.5) and Norway (Table 12.5). Full-
time employees are significantly more likely than self-employed per-
sons in Japan, West Germany, and Sweden to perceive that their pay is
high (Table 12.5).
Job security
The differences between part-time and full-time employees in their
perceived job security are not large. Part-time workers are less likely
than full-time workers in Japan, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, and Norway to report that their job security is good
(Table 12.4), but only in Italy is this difference statistically significant
once we control for the background demographic variables and occu-
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Table 12.4 Mean Reported Level of Job Rewards by Job Status and Country












Full-time 1.7 3.8 2.8 2.9 3.8 1.5
Part-time 1.5 3.8 2.5 2.7 3.7 1.6
Fixed-term 1.9 3.5 2.5 2.8 3.8 1.4
Self-employed 1.5 3.8 3.0 3.2 4.2 2.3
Total 1.6 3.8 2.7 2.9 3.8 1.6
Japan
Full-time 1.7 3.8 2.5 2.2 3.5 1.3
Part-time 1.5 3.7 2.3 1.3 3.4 1.3
Fixed-term 1.6 3.9 2.7 2.2 3.6 1.3
Self-employed 1.6 4.1 2.6 2.1 3.9 2.3
Total 1.6 3.9 2.6 2.1 3.6 1.6
West Germany
Full-time 2.0 4.0 3.0 2.6 4.0 1.5
Part-time 1.7 3.9 2.4 2.0 3.8 1.7
Fixed-term 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.5 4.1 1.4
Self-employed 1.9 3.6 2.8 2.6 4.4 2.5
Total 2.0 3.8 2.8 2.5 4.1 1.6
Great Britain
Full-time 2.0 3.4 2.6 2.7 3.7 1.5
Part-time 1.7 3.6 2.2 2.4 3.7 1.5
(continued)
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Fixed-term 2.1 3.2 2.1 2.5 3.7 1.4
Self-employed 1.9 3.0 2.6 2.5 4.0 2.2
Total 2.0 3.3 2.5 2.6 3.7 1.6
Netherlands
Full-time 1.5 3.8 3.0 2.9 3.9 1.6
Part-time 1.5 3.7 2.6 2.5 3.7 1.6
Fixed-term 1.6 3.5 2.7 2.8 3.8 1.5
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total 1.5 3.7 2.8 2.7 3.8 1.6
France
Full-time 1.9 3.4 2.6 2.4 4.0 1.6
Part-time 1.9 3.5 2.3 2.1 3.8 1.6
Fixed-term 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.1 3.9 1.4
Self-employed 2.0 3.0 2.7 2.4 4.3 2.4
Total 2.0 3.3 2.5 2.3 3.9 1.6
Italy
Full-time 1.8 4.0 2.9 2.5 3.7 1.4
Part-time 1.8 2.7 2.4 2.3 3.6 1.8
Fixed-term 2.3 3.2 2.5 2.1 3.4 1.3
Self-employed 1.9 3.3 2.9 2.7 4.2 2.3
Total 1.9 3.6 2.8 2.5 3.8 1.7
Spain
Full-time 2.4 3.8 2.7 2.5 3.7 1.5
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Part-time 2.6 3.4 2.0 1.6 3.3 1.6
Fixed-term 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.4 3.4 1.2
Self-employed 2.8 3.1 2.5 2.0 4.1 2.5
Total 2.6 3.5 2.5 2.4 3.6 1.5
Denmark
Full-time 1.5 4.2 3.2 2.5 4.4 1.6
Part-time 1.5 4.4 2.8 2.3 4.3 1.5
Fixed-term 1.6 3.5 2.6 2.4 4.4 1.6
Self-employed 1.6 4.3 3.4 2.5 4.8 2.6
Total 1.5 4.2 3.1 2.5 4.4 1.7
Sweden
Full-time 1.8 3.7 2.7 2.7 3.9 1.7
Part-time 1.9 3.5 2.1 2.3 3.7 1.7
Fixed-term 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 3.8 1.7
Self-employed 1.6 3.1 2.6 2.9 4.2 2.5
Total 1.8 3.5 2.5 2.7 3.9 1.8
Norway
Full-time 1.4 3.9 2.6 2.5 3.9 1.5
Part-time 1.5 3.8 2.1 2.0 3.6 1.4
Fixed-term 1.7 3.3 2.3 2.5 3.9 1.4
Self-employed 1.5 3.5 2.6 2.3 4.1 2.4
Total 1.5 3.8 2.5 2.5 3.9 1.6
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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pational differences (Table 12.5). Part-time workers are significantly
more likely than full-time workers in Great Britain and Denmark to per-
ceive that their job security is good (at p ≤ 0.10; Table 12.5). Part-time
workers are significantly less likely than full-time employees in the
United States, West Germany, and Great Britain to worry about the pos-
sibility of losing their jobs (Table 12.5).
Fixed-term employees perceive that they have significantly less job
security than regular full-time workers in the United States, West Ger-
many, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway (Table 12.5). In Japan, the mean of perceived job security is
slightly higher for fixed-term relative to full-time employees (Table
12.4), but this difference is not statistically significant (Table 12.5).
Fixed-term employees are also significantly more likely than regular
full-time workers in West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and
Norway to worry about the possibility of losing their jobs (Table 12.5).
Self-employed persons perceive that they have significantly less job
security than full-time workers in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, and Norway. In Japan, self-employed persons perceive
that they have more job security—and are less likely to worry about los-
ing their jobs—than full-time workers (Table 12.5). 
Opportunities for promotion
Part-time workers are significantly less likely than full-time work-
ers in the United States, Japan, West Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, and Norway to perceive that they have good opportunities for
advancement within their organizations (Table 12.5). Fixed-term
employees perceive that they have lower promotion possibilities than
full-time employees in West Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden
(Table 12.5). Self-employed persons perceive that they have signifi-
cantly better opportunities for promotion than full-time workers only in
the United States and Sweden, and they report lower opportunities for
promotion in Japan, Spain, and Norway (Table 12.5), though the mean-
ing of promotion is somewhat ambiguous for self-employed persons.
Interesting work
In all countries except Spain, self-employed persons are more likely
than regular full-time workers to believe that their jobs are interesting
(Table 12.5). This undoubtedly reflects the greater control over work
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Dependent variable = 












Part-time –0.17* –0.03 –0.16 –0.19* –0.03 0.14**
Fixed-term 0.17 –0.34*** –0.37*** –0.16 –0.11 –0.13*
Self-employed –0.14 0.01 0.08 0.28*** 0.43*** 0.78***
Valuation of reward 0.03 0.10* 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.00 
N = 792 780 780 772 782 782
Adj. R2 = 0.007 0.010 0.078 0.079 0.083 0.233
Japan
Part-time –0.10 –0.20 –0.31 –0.47*** 0.05 0.28***
Fixed-term –0.06 0.06 0.10 –0.01 0.05 0.04 
Self-employed –0.26** 0.42** –0.50*** –0.28** 0.40** 1.21***
Valuation of reward –0.03 0.14** 0.03 0.25*** 0.43*** 0.10***
N = 714 685 661 669 715 713
Adj. R2 = 0.040 0.027 0.045 0.181 0.112 0.383
West Germany
Part-time –0.29** 0.03 –0.32** –0.26* 0.12 0.21***
Fixed-term 0.72*** –1.35*** –0.52*** –0.31* 0.12 –0.08 
Self-employed –0.14 –0.35** –0.31** 0.02 0.11* 0.83***
Valuation of reward 0.04 0.10 0.14*** 0.38*** 0.06*** 0.09***
N = 600 602 604 586 615 601
Adj. R2 = 0.062 0.133 0.193 0.207 0.149 0.286
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Great Britain
Part-time –0.34** 0.30* –0.08 0.02 0.03 0.10 
Fixed-term 0.07 –0.17 –0.43*** –0.05 –0.02 –0.01 
Self-employed –0.13 –0.40*** 0.02 –0.02 0.35*** 0.73***
Valuation of reward 0.03 0.11 0.10* 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.10***
N = 520 531 527 516 527 528
Adj. R2 = 0.006 0.044 0.090 0.114 0.096 0.228
Netherlands
Part-time –0.06 –0.09 –0.26*** –0.24*** –0.14** 0.03 
Fixed-term 0.09 –0.18** –0.15* –0.10 –0.06 –0.12**
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA
Valuation of reward –0.01 0.01 0.06 0.12*** 0.30*** 0.05***
N = 1056 1026 1034 1034 1049 1058
Adj. R2 = 0.003 0.006 0.070 0.069 0.064 0.047
France
Part-time –0.14 0.04 –0.14 –0.06 –0.14 0.07 
Fixed-term 0.54*** –1.05*** –0.43*** –0.26** –0.03 –0.12 
Self-employed –0.03 –0.18 0.10 0.10 0.42*** 0.76***
Valuation of reward 0.01 0.16** –0.06 0.09** 0.27*** 0.02 
N = 670 677 669 656 679 667
Adj. R2 = 0.099 0.120 0.152 0.115 0.113 0.178
445Table 12.5 (continued)
Dependent variable = 












Part-time 0.05 –1.11*** –0.22 –0.12 0.02 0.39***
Fixed-term 0.44** –0.77*** –0.28* –0.34* –0.32* –0.07 
Self-employed 0.01 –0.64*** 0.08 0.17 0.60*** 0.96***
Valuation of reward –0.01 0.24*** 0.08 0.16** 0.19** 0.05*
N = 459 471 474 468 476 472
Adj. R2 = 0.055 0.145 0.068 0.076 0.141 0.416
Spain
Part-time 0.18 0.02 –0.50*** –0.56*** –0.09 0.16 
Fixed-term 0.49*** –0.77*** –0.30** –0.04 –0.23* –0.25***
Self-employed 0.43 –0.85** –0.18 –0.49* 0.39 0.84***
Valuation of reward 0.00 0.08 0.03 –0.07 0.10 0.10***
N = 378 388 388 382 389 386
Adj. R2 = 0.064 0.186 0.102 0.110 0.122 0.162
Denmark
Part-time 0.07 0.23* –0.06 –0.17 0.00 –0.07  
Fixed-term 0.08 –0.80*** –0.46*** –0.11 0.10 0.02  
Self-employed 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.30 0.29** 0.77***
Valuation of reward –0.01 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.13***
N = 622 617 625 622 625 623
Adj. R2 = 0.005 0.063 0.115 0.183 0.189 0.249
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Sweden
Part-time 0.04 –0.14 –0.30*** –0.25** –0.18** –0.01 
Fixed-term 0.42*** –1.46*** –0.50*** –0.25** –0.08 –0.08 
Self-employed –0.16 –0.68*** –0.20* 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.77***
Valuation of reward 0.02 –0.03 –0.07 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.08***
N = 748 751 760 741 766 765
Adj. R2 = 0.034 0.137 0.174 0.132 0.148 0.234
Norway
Part-time 0.07 –0.07 –0.15 –0.22* –0.21*** 0.03 
Fixed-term 0.29*** –0.67*** –0.11 0.01 0.04 –0.03 
Self-employed –0.04 –0.23** –0.08 –0.15* 0.28*** 0.79***
Valuation of reward 0.04** 0.19*** 0.07** 0.19*** 0.31*** 0.11***
N = 1363 1399 1419 1379 1416 1413
Adj. R2 = 0.043 0.089 0.117 0.153 0.143 0.287
*p ≤ 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; * **p ≤ 0.01.
a The data are unstandardized coefficients from equations that control for sex, age, education, and occupation.  The models for the Neth-
erlands do not control for occupation.
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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and “being the boss” that accompanies self-employment. Only in the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway are part-time workers significantly
less likely than full-time workers to perceive that their jobs are interest-
ing (Table 12.5). Only in Italy and Spain are fixed-term employees less
likely than regular full-time workers to believe that their jobs are inter-
esting (at p ≤ 0.10; Table 12.5).
Control over work schedule
Part-time workers are significantly more likely than full-time
workers in the United States, Japan, West Germany, and Italy to
believe that they can decide when they start and finish work (Table
12.5).5 In contrast, fixed-term employees believe that they have signifi-
cantly less control over their schedule than full-time workers (Table
12.4), but this gap is statistically significant only in the United States,
the Netherlands, and Spain (Table 12.5). Self-employed persons per-
ceive that they have significantly more control over their work sched-
ules than full-time workers in all the countries, again reflecting the
greater control over work in general that is enjoyed by the self-
employed (Table 12.5).
The regression analyses reported in Table 12.5 included as a
regressor the degree of importance the respondent placed on the
reward. Thus, any differences between full-time workers and the vari-
ous categories of nonstandard work are not because of differences in
the valuation of these job rewards.6 Valuation of a particular reward
was significantly (positively) related to the job reward in 41 of 66
regressions. This suggests that workers tend to have jobs that corre-
spond to their values, although the exact mechanism by which this
occurs is ambiguous; this could occur, for example, if people select (or
are otherwise sorted into) jobs that have characteristics that they
believe are important, or if people tend to value what they are already
receiving. 
WORK ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS
We examine two kinds of outcomes. First, we study work attitudes
that reflect the worker’s overall affective evaluation of the job (job sat-
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isfaction) and the degree of perceived stress in the job. A large research
literature has established that both of these work-related attitudes are
linked to a wide variety of nonwork outcomes, such as psychological
and physical well-being. Second, we examine work attitudes and
behaviors that are important for the organization and its performance:
the degree to which the worker is committed to the organization
(defined as identifying with the organization’s goals, intending to
remain with the organization, and willingness to work hard in the orga-
nization’s behalf); and the extent to which the worker is absent from
work (self-reported). Table 12.6 presents the means of each of these
dependent variables, separately by work arrangement and country.
To examine differences among work arrangements in these out-
comes, we estimate two models. First, we estimate a slightly modified
version of Equation 1 that also controls for involuntary status (Equa-
tion 2). This determines whether there are differences in these worker
outcomes among the various types of nonstandard work arrangements
after controlling for 1) whether the person works in the particular work
status involuntarily, and 2) demographic background and occupational
variables. Second, we estimate Equation 3, which determines the
extent to which there are net differences among work arrangements,
controlling for work values and job rewards.7
(2) Y = a + b1PT + b2FIXED-TERM + b3SELF-EMPLOYED
+ b4INVOL + b5CONTROLS + e
(3) Y = a + b1PT + b2 FIXED-TERM + b3SELF-EMPLOYED
+ b4INVOL + b5WORK VALUES + b6JOB REWARDS
+ b7CONTROLS + e
Job Satisfaction
The results for job satisfaction are presented in the first set of col-
umns in Table 12.7. The first set of columns in Table 12.6 presents
estimates of overall mean differences in job satisfaction among the var-
ious work arrangements. Part-time workers are more satisfied with
their jobs than are full-time workers in the United States, Japan, West
Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, but part-time workers are
less satisfied than full-time workers in Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Table
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Table 12.6 Mean Reported Levels of Worker Outcomes, Organizational Commitment, and Absenteeism by Job 
Status and Country







Days absent in 
last 6 months
United States
Full-time 5.3 3.3 3.5 3.9 0.8
Part-time 5.5 2.9 3.4 3.9 1.1
Fixed-term 5.3 3.4 3.4 4.0 0.9
Self-employed 5.6 3.3 3.9 4.1 0.7
Total 5.4 3.3 3.5 3.9 0.9
Japan
Full-time 4.7 3.3 3.3 3.5 1.2
Part-time 5.0 2.8 3.3 3.1 1.5
Fixed-term 4.8 3.4 3.4 3.6 1.4
Self-employed 5.2 3.0 3.8 4.0 1.1
Total 4.9 3.2 3.5 3.6 1.3
West Germany
Full-time 5.1 3.3 3.2 3.5 0.8
Part-time 5.3 2.9 3.2 3.2 0.8
Fixed-term 5.3 3.1 3.0 3.4 1.0
Self-employed 5.6 3.1 3.5 3.8 0.6
Total 5.2 3.2 3.2 3.5 0.8
Great Britain
Full-time 5.0 3.3 3.2 3.6 0.8
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Days absent in 
last 6 months
Part-time 5.4 2.6 3.4 3.6 0.6
Fixed-term 5.1 3.2 3.2 3.6 0.8
Self-employed 5.4 3.1 3.4 3.8 0.5
Total 5.1 3.2 3.3 3.6 0.7
Netherlands
Full-time 5.4 3.2 3.4 3.7 0.9
Part-time 5.5 2.6 3.2 3.5 0.9
Fixed-term 5.4 2.9 3.3 3.6 1.0
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA
Total 5.4 2.9 3.3 3.6 0.9
France
Full-time 5.1 3.5 2.9 2.8 0.5
Part-time 5.1 3.3 2.8 2.8 0.5
Fixed-term 5.0 3.1 2.9 2.7 0.5
Self-employed 5.5 3.5 3.4 3.1 0.2
Total 5.1 3.4 2.9 2.8 0.5
Italy
Full-time 5.1 3.2 2.9 2.8 0.7
Part-time 4.6 2.7 3.1 3.2 0.8
Fixed-term 4.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 0.5
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Self-employed 5.5 3.2 3.5 3.3 0.6
Total 5.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 0.7
Spain
Full-time 5.5 3.1 3.3 3.4 0.6
Part-time 5.1 2.6 3.0 3.1 0.3
Fixed-term 5.2 2.7 3.0 3.1 0.5
Self-employed 5.7 3.5 4.0 4.5 0.5
Total 5.4 2.9 3.2 3.3 0.5
Denmark
Full-time 5.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 0.8
Part-time 5.7 2.9 3.5 3.7 1.1
Fixed-term 5.7 2.9 3.4 3.6 0.7
Self-employed 5.8 2.7 4.3 4.5 0.4
Total 5.7 3.1 3.4 3.6 0.8
Sweden
Full-time 5.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 0.8
Part-time 5.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.3
Fixed-term 5.1 3.4 2.9 3.1 0.9
Self-employed 5.7 3.3 3.9 4.1 0.7
Total 5.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 0.9
Norway
Full-time 5.2 3.3 3.3 3.6 0.7
Part-time 5.2 3.3 3.2 3.5 0.8
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Days absent in 
last 6 months
Fixed-term 5.3 3.2 3.3 3.5 0.6
Self-employed 5.4 3.2 3.7 3.9 0.6
Total 5.2 3.3 3.3 3.6 0.7
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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12.6). Only part-time workers in the United States are more satisfied
with their jobs than full-time workers after controlling for the demo-
graphic and occupational variables and measures of involuntary
employment (Table 12.7, column 1), as well as for all measures of
work values and job rewards (Table 12.7, column 2). Part-time workers
in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway are significantly more
satisfied than full-time workers once we control for work values and
job rewards (column 2). Part-time workers in West Germany and the
Netherlands tend to have jobs that respondents perceive as paying less
and having fewer opportunities for promotion (see Table 12.5), and
part-time workers in Norway perceive fewer opportunities for promo-
tion and fewer intrinsic rewards (as do part-time workers in the Nether-
lands). Thus, controlling for job rewards in these countries reveals the
positive direct effects of part-time work on satisfaction. By contrast,
part-time workers in Italy and Sweden remain more dissatisfied than
full-time workers after controlling for our measures of work values and
job rewards.
Self-employed persons are more satisfied with their jobs than regu-
lar full-time workers in all countries (Table 12.6). This appears to be
mainly due to the job rewards associated with self-employment (espe-
cially intrinsic rewards; see Tables 12.4 and 12.5), because controlling
for values and rewards explains the gap between self-employed and
full-time workers in all countries except Sweden and West Germany
(where the gap does not disappear but is reduced substantially and is
significant only at p ≤ 0.10). 
Fixed-term temporaries generally do not differ from full-time
workers in their job satisfaction (Table 12.7, column 1). This is consis-
tent with data from studies comparing contingent workers and more
secure employees (Pearce 1998; see also Futagami 1999). The only
countries in which the differences are significant when all the other
variables are controlled for are West Germany and Norway (Table
12.7, column 2). In part, this reflects the disadvantages associated with
fixed-term employment in these countries (especially in West Ger-
many; see Table 12.5). Controlling for job rewards reveals the positive
direct effect of fixed-term employment on job satisfaction.
Respondents who indicated that they were in their particular work
arrangement involuntarily were significantly more dissatisfied in all
countries,8 except Spain and the Netherlands (where the negative coef-
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Dependent variable = 
Self reported . . . Job satisfaction Work-related stress
1 2 1 2
United States
Part-time 0.23* 0.24** –0.39*** –0.36***
Fixed-term –0.02 0.16 0.01 –0.06 
Self-employed 0.31** –0.09 –0.06 0.05
Involuntary –0.27*** –0.12 0.10 0.10
N = 804 724 799 731
Adj. R2 = 0.025 0.357 0.041 0.049
Japan
Part-time 0.13 0.03 –0.62*** –0.49**
Fixed-term 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Self-employed 0.38** 0.22 –0.44*** –0.29 
Involuntary –0.21* 0.00 0.05 0.00 
N = 665 573 799 573
Adj. R2 = 0.084 0.339 0.066 0.086
West Germany
Part-time 0.14 0.38*** –0.40*** –0.31**
Fixed-term 0.11 0.34** –0.24* –0.34**
Self-employed 0.40*** 0.26* –0.42*** –0.28**
Involuntary –0.26*** –0.11 0.02 0.12 
N = 621 521 620 522
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Adj. R2 = 0.038 0.314 0.041 0.111
Great Britain
Part-time 0.21 –0.05 –0.67*** –0.64***
Fixed-term 0.03 0.02 –0.12 –0.12 
Self-employed 0.36** 0.02 –0.14 –0.09
Involuntary –0.25** –0.24** 0.03 –0.04
N = 535 480 533 480
Adj. R2 = 0.037 0.398 0.099 0.126
Netherlands
Part-time 0.06 0.16** –0.47*** –0.39***
Fixed-term –0.06 0.01 –0.24*** –0.30***
Self-employed NA NA NA NA
Involuntary –0.08 –0.08 0.09 0.06
N = 1058 945 1058 944
Adj. R 2= 0.014 0.283 0.065 0.109
France
Part-time –0.10 0.10 –0.20 –0.07 
Fixed-term –0.09 0.21 –0.40*** –0.49***
Self-employed 0.54** 0.15 0.02 0.02 
Involuntary –0.28*** –0.10 –0.01 0.05 
N = 688 588 690 589
Adj. R2 = 0.033 0.416 0.020 0.061
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Dependent variable = 
Self reported . . . Job satisfaction Work-related stress
1 2 1 2
Italy
Part-time –0.62** –0.67*** –0.48** –0.39 
Fixed-term –0.23 –0.02 –0.38** –0.45**
Self-employed 0.37*** –0.04 –0.06 –0.09 
Involuntary –0.51*** –0.35*** 0.31*** 0.32***
N = 473 440 474 441
Adj. R2 = 0.094 0.325 0.022 0.044
Spain
Part-time –0.23 –0.13 –0.28 –0.27 
Fixed-term –0.18 –0.08 –0.26* –0.19 
Self-employed 0.18 0.11 0.44 0.35 
Involuntary –0.05 0.02 –0.10 –0.09 
N = 389 364 390 365
Adj. R2 = 0.033 0.188 0.015 –0.005
Denmark
Part-time –0.03 0.01 –0.22** –0.21**
Fixed-term 0.01 0.05 –0.11 –0.17 
Self-employed 0.10 –0.14 –0.36** –0.27*
Involuntary –0.24** –0.13 0.13 0.11 
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Adj. R2 = 0.015 0.244 0.084 0.117
Sweden
Part-time –0.39*** –0.23** –0.08 –0.09 
Fixed-term –0.18 0.07 –0.10 –0.06 
Self-employed 0.43*** 0.23* –0.04 0.05 
Involuntary –0.31*** –0.11 0.01 0.00 
N = 784 685 780 684
Adj. R2 = 0.056 0.348 0.019 0.023
Norway
Part-time 0.03 0.22** –0.04 –0.05 
Fixed-term 0.12 0.21*** –0.16*** –0.13*
Self-employed 0.31*** 0.15 –0.17*** –0.05 
Involuntary –0.25*** –0.09 0.19*** 0.20***
N = 1425 1258 1419 1257
Adj. R2 = 0.033 0.307 0.029 0.053
*p ≤ 0.10;**p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
a Unstandardized coefficients are presented. The first equation for each dependent variable controls for sex, age, education, occupation,
and involuntary status.  The second equation includes the controls in the first model as well as the work values and job rewards listed in
Tables 12.2 and 12.4.  (Note: None of the models for the Netherlands includes variables for occupation.)
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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ficients for involuntary status were not significant). This pervasive
negative effect of involuntary work status appears linked in most coun-
tries to the mediating role of work values and job rewards (compare
columns 1 and 2, Table 12.7); only in Great Britain and Italy does the
coefficient of “involuntary” remain significant after we control for val-
ues and rewards (column 2), and this coefficient is markedly reduced in
column 2 in all countries except Great Britain.
Work-Related Stress
Our results for stress are reported in the second set of columns in
Table 12.7. We find that part-time workers report they have signifi-
cantly less stress than full-time workers in all countries except France,
Spain, Sweden, and Norway (see column 1). Adding measures of work
values and job rewards to the equations (see column 2) generally
reduces these differences only slightly, and the gaps in the United
States, Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Den-
mark remain statistically significant. The direct, negative effect of part-
time work on stress may reflect that part-time workers are simply
working fewer hours and have fewer responsibilities than full-time
workers. It may also reflect, in part, the greater control that part-time
workers in some countries say they have over the scheduling (see
Table 12.5).
Self-employed persons report lower levels of work-related stress in
Japan, West Germany, Denmark, and Norway, although this difference
appears to be due largely to work values and job rewards (columns 1
and 2, Table 12.7). Fixed-term employees report lower levels of stress
than full-time workers in West Germany, the Netherlands, France,
Italy, and Norway. The lower stress levels reported by fixed-term
employees in these countries do not appear to be explained by our mea-
sures of work values and job rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table 12.7).
Finally, respondents who indicate that they worked involuntarily in
their work arrangement reported significantly higher levels of stress
only in Italy and Norway (Table 12.7).
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Organizational Commitment and Effort
The results for organizational commitment are presented in the
first two columns in Table 12.8. Although “effort” is one of the three
items in the organizational commitment scale, we examine this vari-
able separately because this is the dimension of commitment that is
most strongly related to job performance (Kalleberg and Marsden
1995).
Part-time workers appear to be less committed overall to their
organizations than full-time workers only in Sweden and France, and
this gap is explained by differences in work values and job rewards
(columns 1 and 2; Table 12.8). Part-time workers appear to be more
committed than full-time workers in Great Britain to their organiza-
tions, although this difference also becomes nonsignificant when we
control for values and rewards.9 The finding of no difference in com-
mitment between part-time and full-time employees in the United
States is consistent with analyses of data from the early 1990s (Kalle-
berg 1995).10 With regard to the measure of whether the employee is
willing to work harder to help the company succeed, part-time workers
are less likely than full-time workers in West Germany and Sweden to
say they are willing to work harder, and these differences are only par-
tially explained by work values and job rewards. Part-time workers in
Italy say they are willing to work harder than full-time workers,
although this difference becomes nonsignificant when we control for
values and rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table 12.8).
Self-employed persons are more committed to their organizations
than regular full-time workers in all 10 of the countries for which we
have data on self-employment, and this gap remains significant except
in Great Britain, Japan, and West Germany once we control for work
values and job rewards. Self-employed persons are significantly more
likely than regular full-time workers in the United States, Japan, West
Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway to say that they
are willing to work harder than they have to; a substantial portion of
this difference is accounted for by work values and job rewards,
although only in the United States, West Germany, and Italy does the
effect of self-employment on effort become nonsignificant.
Fixed-term employees are less committed to their organizations
than full-time workers only in West Germany, Spain, and Sweden,
460Table 12.8 OLS Regressions of Organizational Commitment and Absenteeism on Job Statusa
Dependent variable = 
Self- reported . . .  
Organizational
commitment Effort Days absent in  last  6 months
1 2 1 2 1 2
United States
Part-time 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.18* 0.20*
Fixed-term –0.05 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.05 –0.08 
Self-employed 0.36*** 0.23*** 0.15* 0.14 –0.13 –0.09 
Involuntary 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.11* 0.30*** 0.27***
N = 788 719 781 712 780 713
Adj. R2 = 0.055 0.295 0.026 0.135 0.031 0.049
Japan
Part-time –0.02 0.13 -0.05 –0.01 0.23 0.28
Fixed-term 0.03 0.00 –0.02 –0.01 0.14 0.16
Self-employed 0.23* 0.21 0.41** 0.40** 0.01 –0.02
Involuntary –0.24*** –0.16* –0.27** –0.16 0.01 0.12
N = 662 570 781 564 452 405
Adj. R2 = 0.125 0.310 0.098 0.183 0.015 0.034
West Germany
Part-time –0.05 0.12 –0.43*** –0.25* –0.32 0.04
Fixed-term –0.21* –0.12 –0.25* –0.12 –0.12 –0.05
Self-employed 0.27*** 0.11 0.22* 0.21 –0.26 0.02
Involuntary –0.23*** –0.11 –0.46*** –0.32*** –0.03 0.08
N = 616 519 589 504 614 513
Adj. R2 = 0.077 0.276 0.082 0.222 0.013 0.036
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Great Britain
Part-time 0.22** 0.10 –0.07 –0.19 –0.32** –0.31*
Fixed-term 0.08 0.08 –0.06 –0.02 –0.12 –0.11 
Self-employed 0.23** 0.10 0.14 –0.04 –0.26** –0.32**
Involuntary 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 –0.03 –0.01
N = 519 467 506 456 523 467
Adj. R2 = 0.077 0.360 0.049 0.207 0.040 0.050
Netherlands
Part-time –0.08 –0.04 –0.05 0.00 –0.14 –0.10
Fixed-term –0.05 0.04 –0.01 0.05 –0.02 –0.03
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA
Involuntary –0.03 –0.01 –0.05 –0.03 0.01 –0.03
N = 1055 941 1041 936 1033 926
Adj. R2 = 0.007 0.247 0.008 0.103 0.003 0.029
France
Part-time –0.17* –0.03 –0.03 0.09 0.05 –0.01
Fixed-term –0.02 0.08 0.01 –0.01 –0.03 –0.05
Self-employed 0.49*** 0.33** 0.27 0.15 –0.19 –0.18
Involuntary –0.23*** –0.07 –0.22** –0.01 0.09 0.11
N = 671 579 644 560 681 585
Adj. R2 = 0.066 0.297 0.029 0.113 –0.003 –0.001
Italy
Part-time 0.23 0.19 0.49** 0.37 –0.10 –0.02
Fixed-term 0.02 0.17 0.24 0.30 –0.24 –0.22
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Dependent variable = Self 
reported ...  
Organizational
commitment Effort Days absent in last 6 months
1 2 1 2 1 2
Self-employed 0.53*** 0.21* 0.52*** 0.19 –0.13 0.06
Involuntary –0.22*** –0.07 –0.10 –0.02 0.01 0.00
N = 473 440 468 436 468 436
Adj. R2 = 0.112 0.289 0.071 0.165 0.009 0.007
Spain
Part-time –0.13 0.06 –0.03 0.16 –0.12  –0.20  
Fixed-term –0.22** –0.08 –0.20 –0.03 –0.02  –0.17  
Self-employed 0.67*** 0.60** 0.99*** 0.74** –0.06  –0.09  
Involuntary –0.03 –0.01 0.01 –0.01 –0.21  –0.21  
N = 387 363 376 354 384 361
Adj. R2 = 0.069 0.217 0.073 0.176 –0.006 0.013
Denmark
Part-time 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.35*** 0.34***
Fixed-term 0.06 0.06 –0.14 –0.16 –0.21 –0.23
Self-employed 1.01*** 0.65*** 0.95*** 0.58** –0.16 0.01
Involuntary –0.26*** –0.15** –0.42*** –0.30*** 0.28*** 0.31***
N = 624 609 617 604 622 607
Adj. R2 = 0.096 0.273 0.060 0.144 0.085 0.092
Sweden
Part-time –0.18** –0.09 –0.31*** –0.23** 0.39*** 0.40***
Fixed-term –0.29*** –0.17* –0.29** –0.24* –0.07 –0.01 
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Self-employed 0.72*** 0.50*** 0.66*** 0.47*** –0.16 0.10 
Involuntary –0.21*** –0.09* –0.23*** –0.12* 0.24*** 0.23***
N = 773 677 757 665 772 677
Adj. R 2 = 0.153 0.354 0.139 0.232 0.083 0.084
Norway
Part-time –0.09 0.02 –0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 
Fixed-term 0.03 0.09* –0.04 –0.01 –0.10 –0.07 
Self-employed 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.36*** 0.21** –0.25*** –0.13 
Involuntary –0.11** 0.01 –0.22*** –0.13** 0.21*** 0.22***
N = 1415 1253 1382 1226 1412 1247
Adj. R2 = 0.068 0.332 0.055 0.151 0.026 0.022
*p ≤ 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
a Unstandardized coefficients are presented.  The first equation for each dependent variable controls for sex, age, education, occupation,
and involuntary status.  The second equation includes the controls in the first model as well as the work values and job rewards listed in
Tables 12.2 and 12.4.  (None of the models for the Netherlands includes variables for occupation.)
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
464 Kalleberg and Reynolds
although only in Sweden does this gap remain significant (at p ≤ 0.10)
after controlling for work values and job rewards. The lack of differ-
ence in commitment (and other organizational citizenship behaviors)
between fixed-term and full-time employees reinforces studies dis-
cussed by Pearce (1998).11 In addition, fixed-term employees are less
likely than full-time workers only in West Germany and Sweden to say
that they are willing to work hard, but this gap is largely explained by
differences in work values and job rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table
12.8). 
Respondents in Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, Denmark,
Sweden, and Norway who were in their work arrangement involun-
tarily were significantly less committed to their organizations. In each
country except Japan, Denmark, and Sweden, these differences in
involuntary status appeared to be due to work values and job rewards
(columns 2 and 3). 
Persons who said they were working involuntarily in their work
arrangement were less likely to say that they would work harder than
they had to in Japan, West Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway. Controlling for work values and job rewards did not explain
these differences in West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, or Norway
(although values and rewards reduced the effects of involuntary status
in these countries also). In the United States, persons who said they
were working involuntarily were willing to work harder after control-
ling for work values and job rewards.
Absenteeism
Part-time workers were more likely than full-time workers to
report that they were absent in the last six months only in the United
States, Denmark, and Sweden (Table 12.8, column 1), and these differ-
ences remained strong and significant even after we controlled for
work values and job rewards (column 2). In contrast, part-time workers
in Great Britain were less likely than full-time workers to report that
they were absent, even controlling for involuntary status and the work
values and job rewards. 
Self-employed persons were less likely than full-time workers in
Great Britain and Norway to report absences, although this difference
remains significant only in Great Britain after controlling for values
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and rewards. Respondents in their work arrangement involuntarily
reported that they were more often absent only in the United States,
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. These differences remained, more-
over, even after we controlled for work values and job rewards (column
2). 
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have examined differences between full-time,
open-ended employment relations and three types of nonstandard work
arrangements—part-time, fixed-term temporary, and self-employ-
ment—in work values, job rewards, and work attitudes. The types of
work arrangements, attitudes, and job rewards, and the countries that
we have analyzed are extremely varied. Accordingly, our results are
complex and belie easy generalizations; nevertheless, they suggest
three main conclusions.
First, part-time workers appear generally to have work attitudes
and behaviors that are at least as positive, if not more so, than full-time
workers. Part-time workers are equally or more satisfied with their jobs
than full-time employees in most countries. Part-time workers tend also
to be no less committed to their organizations than full-time workers
and equally likely to say that they are willing to work harder than they
have to in order to help their companies succeed. Moreover, part-time
workers generally say that they experience less stress at work and do
not report being absent from their jobs more often than full-time work-
ers. 
One reason for why part-time workers have generally positive
work attitudes relative to full-time employees is that, in many coun-
tries, their work values appear to correspond fairly well to their job
rewards. Although part-time workers and full-time workers may differ
in the rewards they obtain from their jobs, these differences correspond
to variations in what these two groups want from their jobs. Thus, part-
time workers are generally less likely than full-time workers to per-
ceive that their pay is high, but part-time workers are also less likely
than full-time workers to value a high income. The differences between
part-time workers and full-time workers in perceived job security are
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not that large, but in the countries in which full-time workers have
greater perceived job security, the part-time workers also tend to value
security less. Part-time workers are less likely than full-time workers to
feel that they have good opportunities for advancement, but part-time
workers also generally place less importance on such opportunities. On
the other hand, part-time workers value flexible hours more than full-
time workers in a number of countries, and part-time workers are as or
more likely to believe that they can control their schedules. These
results are consistent with our finding that individuals in most coun-
tries tend to work part-time voluntarily: more full-time workers desire
part-time work than vice versa.
Sweden appears to be an exception to this pattern. Part-time work-
ers in Sweden are less satisfied with their jobs than full-time workers.
Swedish part-time workers are also less committed to their organiza-
tions overall and less likely to say that they would work harder than
they have to in order to help their companies succeed. In Sweden, part-
time workers also reported that they were absent from their jobs more
often than full-time workers. Economic conditions in Sweden may
explain some of these results. Sweden went through a very deep reces-
sion in the mid-1990s, and a considerable number of part-time workers
worked involuntarily, preferring more hours. Their inability to secure
full-time employment may have contributed to their unhappiness with
their part-time status. The negative attitudes displayed by part-time
workers in Sweden may also reflect the higher expectations that
Swedes have with regard to part-time work. For example, Sweden is
the only country in which part-time workers were significantly more
likely than full-time workers to regard work as a central life interest.
These gaps between part-time workers and full-time workers in Swe-
den may also reflect, in part, differences in job rewards. Swedish part-
time workers are less likely than full-time workers to believe that their
jobs are interesting, offer good opportunities for promotion, are secure,
or pay well. 
A second conclusion is that fixed-term employees generally do not
display more negative work attitudes and behaviors than full-time
employees. Consistent with most prior research, fixed-term temporar-
ies do not differ much from full-time workers in their job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, reported effort, and absenteeism. Some of
these similarities may reflect the desire of fixed-term employees to dis-
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play positive work attitudes and behaviors in the hope of obtaining per-
manent positions with the employer. It may also reflect the perception
in some countries that fixed-term employment is a normal step on a
career progression toward full-time employment. Hence, fixed-term
employees may not display more negative attitudes despite being less
likely than full-time workers to perceive that their pay is high and that
they have good job security, to worry more about losing their jobs, and
to believe that they have less control over their schedules. 
Despite these differences in perceived job rewards, fixed-term and
full-time employees generally do not differ much in their work values
among the various countries (with the possible exceptions of the valua-
tion of job security and high earnings, on which fixed-term employees
place lower importance than full-time workers in four and three coun-
tries, respectively). The lack of differences in the importance placed on
various aspects of jobs between full-time and fixed-term employees is
consistent with the view that the growth in nonstandard work in some
countries, especially with regard to temporary employment, is not pri-
marily due to shifts in workers’ preferences for temporary work but
rather reflects a demand-side phenomenon accompanying employers’
search for flexibility in employment relations.
Third, self-employed persons generally display more positive work
attitudes and reported behaviors than persons who are employed full-
time. The self-employed are more satisfied with their jobs and are usu-
ally more committed to their organizations. Self-employed workers
report lower levels of stress and fewer absences in some countries, but
generally do not differ from full-time employees once work values and
job rewards are controlled for. The more positive work attitudes on the
part of self-employed persons largely reflect the greater control over
their work; self-employed persons in every country were more likely
than full-time employees to believe that they had more control over
their schedules, and in almost all countries they were more likely to
report that their jobs were interesting (a job reward that is closely
related to the amount of autonomy that one has). Moreover, self-
employed persons were more likely than full-time employees to report
that they valued flexible work, which they are able to attain by virtue of
their greater control over schedules. Otherwise, there were few system-
atic and significant differences in the work motivations between self-
employed persons and full-time employees.
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Our analyses of the relationships between types of work arrange-
ments and work values, job rewards, and worker attitudes and reported
behaviors were not ideal. We would have liked to distinguish between
fixed-term temporaries and those who are employed by a temporary
help agency, as well as to differentiate between groups such as inde-
pendent contractors and the self-employed. By emphasizing differ-
ences between regular full-time employees and the various
nonstandard work arrangements, we have also glossed over differences
within part-time (a particularly heterogeneous category), temporary,
and self-employed persons (as well as differences among full-time
employees). We could also have introduced much more complexity
into our analyses of worker attitudes. For example, we did not examine
potential interactions by gender, age, education, or occupation, in an
effort to focus on the overall patterns within each country. Nor did we
assess the likely simultaneous relationships between variables such as
work status and effort. These matters constitute important topics on the
agenda for future research on the correlates and consequences of non-
standard work arrangements within and among countries.
Our results, finally, suggest a number of country differences in the
relationships between nonstandard work arrangements, on one hand,
and work values, job rewards, and work attitudes, on the other. We
have speculated about some possible explanations of these country dif-
ferences but have not sought to account for them systematically. How-
ever, accounting for these country differences constitutes another
important agenda item for research on nonstandard work arrangements.
Future cross-national research should use more refined measures of
nonstandard work arrangements to better differentiate between types of
part-time workers (i.e., fixed-term temporaries, on-call workers, and
temporary help agency employees) and independent contractors and
other self-employed persons. Accounting for cross-national sources of
variation in nonstandard work arrangements and work attitudes is
important for understanding institutional and cultural differences in
employment relations and their consequences for workers.
Work Attitudes and Nonstandard Work Arrangements 469
Notes
1. These data do not permit us to distinguish direct-hire temporaries from employees
of temporary help agencies. We also cannot differentiate between independent
contractors and other self-employed persons.
2. For simplicity and because of sample size restrictions, we constructed our mea-
sures of the four work arrangements to be mutually exclusive. In reality, combina-
tions of the work statuses may occur (e.g., fixed-term or self-employed persons
can work either full-time or part-time). 
3. We present unweighted results in all tables. Approximately half of the countries
do not supply weights: the data from France, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, Spain,
and Sweden come with weights, but the data from the United States, Japan, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and Norway do not. 
4. We can obtain a sense of whether fixed-term workers are working in this arrange-
ment involuntarily from responses to the question about the importance of job
security. We find that 88 percent of fixed-term temporaries in Japan, 95 percent in
the United States, 90 percent in France, 95 percent in Great Britain, 97 percent in
West Germany, 83 percent in Sweden, and 100 percent in Italy report that having
job security is “important” or “very important” to them. This suggests that the
vast majority of fixed-term temporaries are working in this arrangement involun-
tarily.
5. The results for part-time workers versus full-time workers in the United States are
consistent with those obtained by Golden (2001) in his analysis of the May 1997
Current Population Survey data. 
6. We also estimated the models reported in Table 12.5 with measures of work val-
ues omitted. The results were nearly identical to those presented in Table 12.5. In
only 9 of 192 cases did the coefficient of a job status variable change from nonsig-
nificant to significant (or vice versa), and in 7 of 9 of these cases, this involved a
change from p ≤ 0.10 to nonsignificance (or vice versa). The results of this sup-
plemental analysis are available on request from the authors.
7. Equation 3 estimates the impact of work values and job rewards separately. This
model produces the same estimates of the job status parameters as one that con-
trols for each job reward as well as the difference between the job reward and the
respondent’s valuation of the reward. 
8. See the discussion of “volition” as an important determinant of work-related atti-
tudes in Krausz, Brandwein, and Fox (1995). Feldman, Doerpinghaus, and Turn-
ley’s (1995) survey of 186 temporary agency employees in the southeast region of
the United States also found that involuntary temporary workers are less satisfied
on a variety of dimensions (and less committed) than temporary workers who
work voluntarily. See also Aeppel (1997) and Ellingson, Gruys, and Sackett
(1998).
9. Similarly, Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (1999) found a great deal of similarity
between part-time workers and full-time workers with regard to organizational
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commitment and organizational citizenship behaviors in a number of public ser-
vice occupations in Britain. 
10. See also the review by Van Dyne and Ang (1998), which cites a number of studies
that found no evidence that contingent workers in the United States had less posi-
tive work attitudes than regular employees. They did, however, find that contin-
gent (temporary or on-call) workers in Singapore were less committed and
engaged in fewer organizational citizenship behaviors than regular employees in
Singapore. They explain this by arguing that contingent workers in Singapore
work in these jobs voluntarily (due to very tight labor markets) and so expect less
of their employers (and vice versa). By contrast, contingent workers in the United
States often work in temporary jobs involuntarily, and so may display positive
attitudes in their attempts to obtain regular employment.
11. Futagami (1999) found that, in Japan, temporary agency employees (not fixed-
term temporaries, as analyzed here) were less committed to their organizations
than regular full-time employees, although temporary workers were also found to
have a relatively high level of organizational commitment.
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Appendix A
ISSP Data
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is an annual program of
cross-national collaboration among mostly academic survey organizations that
compile comparable cross-national data on social attitudes and values (see
Davis and Jowell 1989). Founded in 1984, the ISSP has grown to include 37
nations. In 1997, 27 countries participated in collecting data on “work orienta-
tions” (ASEP 1999). The merging of the data into a cross-national data set was
performed by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of
Cologne, in collaboration with the Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políti-
cos in Spain.
In the ISSP, efforts are made to ask questions in the same way in each
country, thus producing a high-quality, cross-culturally comparable data set.
The annual topics for ISSP are developed over several years by a subcommittee
and pretested in various countries. The annual plenary meeting of ISSP adopts
the final questionnaire. The ISSP researchers concentrate on developing ques-
tions that are 1) meaningful and relevant to all countries, and 2) can be ex-
pressed in an equivalent manner in all relevant languages. The questionnaire is
originally drafted in British English and translated to other languages using
standard back-translation procedures. The collaboration between organizations
in the ISSP is not special or intermittent, but routine and continual. 
ISSP rules require that all surveys be representative probability samples of
the adult population of each country. Checks are made against census and other
gold standards in each country to ensure that the samples obtained are repre-
sentative. Descriptions of the samples are included in the codebook for each
country. In some countries (e.g., United States, Great Britain, and sometimes
Germany), the ISSP is a module on a larger survey (General Social Survey;
British Social Attitudes Survey; and the Allgemeinen Bevolkerungsumfragen
der Socialwissenschaften [ALLBUS]), but in most countries, it is either part of
a larger omnibus survey or a stand-alone survey. Further information on the
ISSP is available on two Web sites: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialfor-
schung, University of Cologne: http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/en/issp/ and ISSP
Secretariat: http://www.issp.org/.
Additional information on the ISSP is available from the ISSP secretari-
at: Tom W. Smith, NORC, 1155 East 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637; phone:
(773) 256-6288; fax: (773) 753-7866; e-mail: smitht@norcmail.uchica-
go.edu. See also Smith 2000. 
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Table 12B.1  Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable name Description Coding
Work values
Work Please tick one box for each statement 
below to show how much you agree or 
disagree with it, thinking of work in 
general: work is a person's most 
important activity.
1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
From the following list, please tick one box for each item to show 
how important you personally think it is in a job:
Job security Job security 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
High earnings High income 1 = strongly disagree to
5 = strongly agree
Opportunity for  
promotion
Good opportunities for advancement 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Interesting work An interesting job 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Flexible hours A job that allows someone to decide 
their times or days of work
1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Involuntary For persons who are not self-employed, 
this variable is coded “1” if the person 
works full-time but would rather work 
part-time and vice versa.  For self-
employed persons, this variable is 
coded as “1”if the person says that he/
she would rather work for someone 
else.
1 = Involuntary; 
0 = Voluntary
Job rewards
Fear of losing job To what extent, if at all, do you worry 
about the possibility of losing your job?
1 = I do not worry at all to 
4 = I worry a great deal
For each of these statements about your (main) job, please tick one 
box to show how much you agree or disagree that it applies to your 
job.
High earnings My income is high 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Job security My job is secure 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
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Opportunity for  
promotion
My opportunities for advancement are 
high
1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Interesting 
work
My job is interesting 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Flexible hours Which of the following statements best 
describes how your working hours are 
decided?  (By working hours, we mean 
the times you start and finish work and 
not the total hours you work per week 
or month.)
1 = starting and finishing 
times are decided by my 
employer and I cannot 
change them on my own.
2 = I can decide the time I 
start and finish work, 
within limits.
3 = I am entirely free to 
decide when I start and 
finish work.
Worker outcomes
Job satisfaction How satisfied are you in your (main) 
job?
1 = completely dissatisfied 
to 7 = completely satisfied
Stress at work How often do you find your work 
stressful?






Scale computed as the average score on 
three variables:
hlporg1r: I am willing to work harder 
than I have to in order to help the firm 
or organization succeed.
pridorgr: I am proud to be working for 
my firm or organization.
styorg3r: I would turn down another 
job that offered quite a bit more pay in 
order to stay with this organization.
For each of the three items 
and the scale
1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Cronbach's alpha = 0.63
Effort To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statement: 
I am willing to work harder than I have 
to in order to help the firm or 
organization succeed.
1 = strongly disagree to
 5 = strongly agree
Days absent in 
last 6 months
About how many days have you been 
absent from work in the last 6 months 
(not counting vacation)?
0 = none         1 = 1–5
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